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 RETHINKING IT GOVERNANCE FOR SMES 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to critically rethink the concepts and the theoretical foundations of 
IT governance in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
Design/methodology/approach - The paper is based on multiple case studies. Eight cases of outsourced 
information system projects where failures occurred were selected. An outsourced information system failure 
(OISF) is suggested as a failure of governance of the IT in a SME environment. A structure for stating 
propositions derived from two competing theories is proposed (Agency Theory and Theory of Trust). 
Findings – The results reveal that trust is slightly more important than control issues like output-based 
contracts and structured controls in the governance of IT in SMEs. 
Practical implications - The world of SMEs is significantly different from that of large companies, and 
therefore, the concept of IT governance in SMEs needs reconsideration. For researchers and practitioners, it 
would be more meaningful to focus on actual, working SMEs instead of on a version of their activities derived 
from those of large companies. 
Originality/value - The paper offers two contributions. First, it elaborates the limited research on IT in 
SMEs and second, it brings theoretical foundations for their IT governance. The value of IT governance in 
SMEs is explained. 
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RETHINKING IT GOVERNANCE FOR SMES 
 
Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a significant role as engines of economic and social 
development all over the world. Many scholars argue that a small and medium-sized enterprise cannot be seen 
through the lens of a large firm (Ballantine et al., 1998). Therefore, the limited theories explaining IT 
(Information Technology) governance in large organizations cannot be linearly extrapolated to SMEs, since 
we are dealing with a completely different economic, cultural and managerial environment. Notwithstanding 
the efforts to develop guidelines for governing IT in SMEs, such as the Cobit QuickStart method, the results of 
applying these frameworks in SMEs are rather disappointing (IT Governance Institute, 2007). Scholars and 
practitioners are too grounded in their way of thinking, and maintain a simple vision of a SME as a scale 
model of a large firm (Raymond, 1985). There is also a lack of genuine SME-centred theories that can lead to 
general inferences about how SMEs should govern their IT. Riemenschneider et al. stated that, 
“...organizational theories and practices, such as bureaucratic structure and organizational behaviour applicable 
to large organizations, may not be valid in small ones” (Riemenschneider et al., 2003: 269).  
SMEs seldom have a dedicated IT staff or a well-defined and formal IS (Information Systems) function (Adam 
and O'Doherty, 2000). Due to their small scale, and hence a lack of in house IT skills, SMEs depend more on 
IT vendors than large companies (Thong, 2001; Thong et al., 1997). However, outsourcing is not without risks 
or problems. From a managerial point of view, we associate risk in IT outsourcing with negative outcomes. 
One risk scenario that is of special interest for this research is the occurrence of IS failures. IS failures can lead 
to disputes, which can be classified as litigation and non-litigation. The focus of this work is the constructs of 
trust and control in relation to outsourced IS projects in SME environments. This paper is based upon on-going 
research on IT governance in SMEs and reports on some recent findings based on a positivistic research 
strategy of multiple case studies, as well as on investigation of IS failures in an outsourced SME environment. 
In the following sections, we first provide overviews of the specific relationships between SMEs and IT, 
outsourced IS failures and IT governance. We elaborate on the theoretical foundations of trust and control in 
the fourth section. The fifth section details the research methodology and design, and includes the results of 
our testing of the propositions by the multiple case studies, our empirical observations, and a discussion of our 
findings. Finally, our conclusions are stated in the sixth section, including the implications of our findings for 
future research and practice. 
SMEs and IT 
Research and literature have highlighted the problems of defining SMEs. Companies differ in size, location, 
ownership structure, financial performance, maturity, and management style. It would be ideal to clearly 
define a SME before starting any research on them, but this is not straightforward. There are many 
characteristics that identify a SME besides size. The European Commission took an initiative to define a SME 
in terms of microeconomic characteristics such as turnover (not exceeding 50 million euro), annual balance 
sheet total (not exceeding 43 million euro) and headcount (fewer than 250 persons) (Commission 2003).  
In this research, we focus on SMEs with a headcount less than 200 employees, family-owned businesses that 
are managed by family members, with a turnover less than €20 million, mainly operating in a domestic market 
and having no IT department. Although this group of SMEs is still very heterogeneous, many similarities in 
implementing an IT project can be observed for this group. 
  
 
Existing research on IT and SMEs is fragmented in terms of findings and conceptual approaches (Harrison et 
al., 1997; Premkumar, 2003). However, we focus here on two major findings: the role of the CEO as the 
principal decision maker in SMEs (Cragg, 2008; Lefebvre et al., 1997; Thong et al., 1997), and the 
dependency of SMEs on external IT expertise (Thong, 2001; Thong et al., 1997). Thong has shown that both 
findings are related. “The results show that the most effective IS implementation environment is one in which 
both top management support and external IS experts work as a team” (Thong, 1997: 253). CEO-centric 
decision making suggests that SMEs require less bureaucratic methods of management and greater flexibility, 
with a strong focus on people and less focus on process orientation. SMEs still tend to be too much task-
oriented, leaving almost no space for the adaptation of cross-functional capabilities into rigid business 
processes (Antlova, 2009; Chang et al., 2010). The need for external expertise suggests a staff with a lack of 
specialization and a lack of people able to undertake a wide range of duties. The smaller the business, the less 
it is able to hire people with specialized skills, for example, IT skills (Alpar and Reeves, 1990). The shortage 
of internal IT capabilities and techniques is the major reason why SMEs tend to outsource IT, and 
consequently, depend heavily on external IT expertise. Here we take a snapshot of organizations that have 
outsourced their IS function almost completely, a decision often made in SMEs out of necessity. 
Outsourced IS failures 
Despite the numerous success stories illustrating the advantages of bringing IT into organizations, it is widely 
accepted that the processes of designing, developing and implementing IT are cumbersome and not 
straightforward. Both recent and previous reports show that IS projects frequently fail. Broad and elaborate 
research on IS failures has been conducted for more than four decennia (Avison et al., 2006; Ewusi-Mensah, 
2003; Iacovou and Dexter, 2005; Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987; Sauer, 1993). Practitioners and expert 
witnesses frequently report IS failures in SMEs as well as in large companies (Standish Group, 2004). 
IS failures can be divided into expectation (Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1987) and termination (Sauer, 1993) 
failures. Expectation failures can be further categorized into correspondence, process and interaction failures. 
Correspondence failures occur when information systems are evaluated in terms of previously defined design 
objectives. A lack of correspondence between design objectives and evaluation is seen as a failure. Process 
failures occur when there is unsatisfactory development performance, i.e., failure to produce a workable 
system or to deliver within the budget constraints of time and costs. Process failures are sometimes called 
„runaways‟ or escalating projects (Iacovou and Dexter, 2005). Interaction failures represent the mismatch 
between requirements and user acceptance. An interaction failure appears when an information system is not 
used. In summary, an expectation failure is the inability of an information system to meet the expectations of 
the stakeholders. 
Sauer introduced a more pragmatic concept of the termination failure (Sauer, 1993). According to Sauer, an IS 
failure only occurs when the development process or the operation of an information system causes 
dissatisfied stakeholders to abandon the project. 
We argue that there is an extra dimension to IS failures that is not fully explained covered by those descriptive 
models, which we call the outsourced IS Failure (OISF). An OISF is a failure that occurs during an IS project 
in an outsourced environment. We use the taxonomy of outsourcing options of Lacity and Hirschheim 
(Dibbern et al., 2004) and we focus on project management. Some academics have already pointed out that 
outsourcing increases the risks that lead to IS failures (Aubert et al., 2003; Bahli and Rivard, 2003; Natovich, 
2003). In our work, we focus on IS project failure factors, not from a risk perspective but from real instances  
of failed projects. However we used a list of possible failure factors based on the validated list of risk factors 
edited by Schmidt et al. to examine our cases and added extra outsourcing risk factors based on the work of 
Aubert et al. and Natovitch (Schmidt et al., 2001; Aubert et al., 2005; Natovich, 2003).  
  
 
IT governance 
IT governance is a term that has been evolving rapidly over the last few years, especially in practitioners‟ 
communities. The IT Governance Institute is taking a leading role in the debate. Many aspects of IT 
governance have been described and detailed but little work has been done to pull it all together. From an 
academic perspective, research on IT governance is emerging as an important area of enquiry (Bernroider, 
2008; Huang et al., 2010; Schwarz and Hirschheim, 2003; Weill and Ross, 2005).  
The vital role of IT in enterprises has led to the view that IT governance must be implemented to sustain and 
enable business objectives and to mitigate associated risks. IT governance directly influences the benefits 
generated by organizational IT investments (Weill and Ross, 2004). This holds true for large as well as for 
small businesses. However, the mechanisms of IT governance are applied much more extensively in large 
enterprises than in SMEs (Huang et al., 2010). Existing mechanisms of IT governance, such as the way critical 
IT processes are conducted, the creation of management guidelines to accompany these IT processes, and the 
assignment of responsibilities and accountability seem to fail in SMEs, where decision making is mostly 
centred round one person (Levy and Powell, 2008). The concept of IT governance originates from the 
discussion of strategic IT planning and IT management, but its link to an overall corporate governance 
structure is „a bridge too far‟ for most SMEs. This calls for a rethinking of the concept of IT governance when 
applied in SMEs. 
We see an outsourced information system failure (OSIF) as a failure of governing IT in a SME environment 
and we propose a new structure for IT governance in SMEs, stating propositions derived from both Agency 
Theory and the Theory of Trust. How and why OISFs occur in SMEs are the theoretical questions addressed in 
this paper. An overview of the literature provides strong support for the belief that the constructs of trust and 
control are both of significant importance. Mohtashami et al. stated that, “... The absence of a proper level of 
trust is the primary reason for a large percentage (40 to 70 percent) of collaboration failure ...” (Mohtashami et 
al., 2006: 27). 
Research design 
To explain OISF and the failure of IT governance in SMEs, we draw on Agency Theory and on the Theory of 
Institutional Trust in order to construct testable propositions. We consider both theories as process theories 
(Markus and Robey, 1988; Soh and Markus, 1995) as well as rival or competing theories. Both theories have 
discrete outcomes that may not occur, even when qualifying conditions are present, and have a logical form in 
which conditions are expressed as qualifications that are necessary or sufficient, rather than as dependent and 
independent variables. Time is also a crucial factor for both theories, since these conditions are built up during 
the course of an IT project. Both theories can be considered as falsifiable, with the potential of deducing 
logical and consistent propositions (Lee, 1989). We also construct rival propositions from the theories. The 
theories all have at least some explaining power. We follow the same logic to induce propositions such as 
Sarker and Lee (Sarker and Lee, 2003). First, we elaborate on the two theories. 
Trust 
The concept of trust is subtle, diffuse and elusive. Although there is agreement on the importance of trust, 
there also appears to be disagreement on a suitable definition of the construct (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). Trust 
can be seen as a coordinating mechanism, based on shared moral values and norms, and supporting collective 
co-operation and collaboration within uncertain environments (Reed, 2001). Blois gives a number of 
definitions of trust that are frequently quoted in papers (Blois, 1999). Trust/control relationships between 
organizations can be seen as highly complex structures of social relations and as processes that are needed for 
the generation and maintenance of collective action. The concept of trust is crucial in business interactions that 
are characterized by mutual dependency, combined with a lack of mutual control. Some researchers argue that 
trust is also reciprocal. According to Reed, “... the essential character of all trust relations is their reciprocal 
  
 
nature. Trust tends to evoke trust, distrust to evoke distrust ... As trust shrinks, distrust takes over ...” (Reed, 
2001: 203). Gefen gives a working definition of trust that is already used in IS research and is the most 
suitable for our empirical setting. ”Trust is the belief that others upon whom one depends, yet has little control 
over, will not take advantage of the situation by behaving in an opportunistic manner, but rather, will fulfil 
their expected commitments by behaving ethically, dependably and fairly, especially under conditions 
involving risk and potential loss” (Gefen, 2004: 264). 
Trust can occur on a personal level or on an organizational level. The latter is also known as institutionalized 
trust. The concept of personal trust appears to be more relevant in family-owned SMEs, where the central role 
of the CEO has been identified as a key factor for effective IS implementation. However, Zaheer et al. found 
that interpersonal and organizational trust are highly correlated (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
Sabherwal states that inter-organizational relationships involve a psychological contract and a formal written 
contract. The written contract is negotiated and well understood, while the psychological contract consists of 
unwritten and largely unspoken sets of expectations held by the transacting parties about each others‟ 
prerogatives and obligations (Sabherwal, 1999). Governing IT in an outsourced environment requires dealing 
with both types of contracts. Trust supports the psychological contract. An outsourced IT project in a SME 
environment can be seen as an interpersonal cooperation and exchange. Trust limits the need for structured 
controls by reducing the perceived need to guard against opportunistic behaviour when unexpected changes 
occur in an IT project. Structural controls are appropriate mechanisms and include deliverables, reporting 
arrangements, meeting schedules, and penalty clauses to govern the project and to address compliance with the 
contract (Sabherwal, 1999). Trust can also be seen as a mechanism for reducing complexity. Trust does not 
contribute to the complexity, but tries to avoid or to reduce it. Theoretically, the role of trust in an outsourced 
IS environment appears to be an important one. 
The concept of trust has already been used in IS research (Gefen, 2004; Lander et al., 2004; Mohtashami et al., 
2006; Sabherwal, 1999) and in related environments, such as R&D (Blomqvist et al., 2005), and also in the 
study of business-to-business relationships (Blois ,1999). 
Control 
A predominant theory, central to western management thinking and one of the cornerstones for governance, is 
the Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The Agency Theory has its roots in the 
research of decision making and is used as an explanation of the theory of the firm. Its original setting cast the 
principal as the firm‟s owner(s) and the agent as the manager(s). Agency Theory and derivative theories, such 
as Control Theory and IT Governance are also very popular theories used in IS research (Aubert et al., 2005; 
Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Weill and Ross, 2004). Together with Transaction Cost Economy Theory, 
Agency Theory is seen as the foundation of IS outsourcing (Dibbern et al., 2004). However, its contribution 
has not always been made clear, since the excessive truth-claims and assumptions of Agency Theory are based 
entirely on analyses in environments other than IT/IS.  
Agency Theory views the problems that occur in outsourced environments as the results of three factors: goal 
differences, differences in risk behaviour and asymmetry of information. It assumes that the agent vendor has 
private information about the quality of the IS that is not available to the principal (SME). According to 
Agency Theory, agents can therefore act in their own best interest and exhibit opportunistic behaviour, which 
can lead to moral hazard. However, when the principal and the agent are making contracts, the negotiated 
transaction can never be described perfectly. Anderlini and Felli state that, “... the contracting parties may lack 
the necessary degree of rationality to accurately (the ability, the time, the language or the computational 
resources) necessary to describe the various states of nature in the ex-ante contract they draw up ...” (Anderlini 
and Felli, 2004: 5). 
The complex balancing relationship between trust and control is elaborated by Reed (Reed, 2001). Although 
this relationship can be seen as a nexus, there is also rivalry in the theoretical underpinnings. However, this 
rivalry can be considered to be commingled rivalry (Yin, 2003). 
  
 
Derived propositions 
According to Agency Theory, opportunistic behaviour is corrected by control. Kirsch views control as 
encompassing all attempts to ensure that individuals in organizations act in a manner that is consistent with 
meeting its organizational goals and objectives (Kirsch, 1997). There are several ways to deploy control. Here, 
we consider the creation of an outcome-based contract and on the implementation of structured controls to 
obtain compliance with the contract mechanisms used to deploy control. An outcome-based contract offers the 
best solution in a setting where there is asymmetry of information (Grossman and Hart, 1983). We came to the 
following three propositions, induced from Agency Theory. 
P1. An OISF must happen if there are no structured controls implemented. 
Proposition P1 implies that the absence of implemented, structured controls is a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for an OISF. This also implies that if there are no structured controls implemented, and there is no 
OISF, the proposition is falsified. Structural controls can be seen as the mechanisms of IT governance and 
examples are steering committees, management guidelines, policies and procedures.  
P2. An OISF must happen if the contract is not outcome-based. 
Proposition P2 implies that the absence of an outcome-based contract is a sufficient, but not necessary 
condition for an OISF. This also implies that if there is no outcome-based contract and there is no OISF, the 
proposition is falsified. In extremis, an outcome-based contract is a no-cure-no-pay contract. 
P3. An OISF must happen if there are no structured controls implemented and the contract is not 
outcome-based. 
Proposition P3 implies that in an outcome-based contract, together with (logically „and‟), the absence of 
implemented structured controls is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for an OISF. This also implies that 
if the combined condition is true and there is no OISF, the proposition is falsified. Proposition P3 is much 
stronger than P1 and P2 separately, since both conditions (outcome-based contract and structured controls) 
must appear simultaneously. 
We also induced a proposition from Institutional Trust Theory. The operationalization of the construct of trust 
is based on the work of Lander and Sabherwal, who divided trust into three types: calculus-based, knowledge-
based and identification-based trust (Sabherwal, 1999; Lander et al., 2004). 
Calculus-based or deterrence-based trust is the lowest form of trust and exists when both parties can be trusted 
to keep their word. The deterrence is rooted in the rewards and punishments of the project and can be found in 
the project contract. Knowledge-based trust is based on the predictability of the other party, developed though 
knowing the other sufficiently well that their behaviour is predictable. The highest order of trust is 
identification-based trust and is developed when one party has fully internalized the other‟s wants, and this 
mutual understanding is developed to the point that each can effectively act for the other (Lander et al., 2004). 
These authors also developed a list with trust-building mechanisms for each level of trust. Based on the 
characteristic that trust has a reciprocal nature, we looked for distrust-evoking events and for trust-building 
mechanisms in our observations. 
We came to the following proposition. 
P4. An OISF must happen if there is no trust between the principal (SME CEO) and the agent. 
Proposition P4 implies that the absence of trust (or distrust) between both parties in the exchange is a 
sufficient, but not necessary condition for an OISF. This also implies that if there is trust between the principal 
and the agent and there is an OISF, the proposition is falsified. 
  
 
Research methodology 
In this research, a qualitative analysis of multiple SME cases was undertaken. The cases are presented in Table 
1. The choice for qualitative research is based on the accessibility of well-documented, secondary data in the 
litigation files of failed IS projects in SMEs. Eight cases of IS projects were selected. We used the concept of a 
termination error to define a failed project (Sauer, 1993).  
OISFs are embedded in an organizational context that is not separable from the unit of analysis. There are 
definitely more variables to be studied than there is available data. This is a situation where the case study is 
an ideal research strategy (Lee, 1989; Yin, 2003). According to Yin, case study research is useful when a 
phenomenon cannot be studied outside the context in which it occurs or where the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Sauer shares the opinion that research of IS failures is best 
done by case study (Sauer, 1993; Yin, 2003). The development of the research design and methodology was 
inspired by the work of researchers experienced in case study research (Dube and Pare, 2003; Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Lee, 1989). 
 
Case 
Name 
Sector Turnover 
(million) 
Staff Type of 
Project 
Cost of 
Project  
Result Dispute 
Resolution 
Rockit Textile €11.64 67 ERP1  €644000 No failure - 
Woody Trading n.a. < 200 SDI
2 €372000 Process 
failure 
Litigation 
Mach Manufacturing €12.75 146 ERP €90000 Expectation 
failure 
Litigation 
Bupo Software  €0.475 8 SD3 €50000 Process 
failure 
Litigation 
Dybo Trading €15.65 16 SDI €50000 Process 
failure 
Litigation 
 Stones Manufacturing €31.25 200 ERP  €750000 Expectation 
failure 
ADR
5 
Boxcars Service €5.00 - 
€20.00  
10-30 DIS
4 60x 
€75000 
Expectation 
failure 
ADR 
Hero Service €4.00 5 SDI €75000 Escalation 
failure 
Litigation 
1
 ERP = Enterprise Resource Planning 
2 
SDI = Software Development and Implementation 
3
 SD = Software Development 
4
 DIS = Dealer Information System 
5
 ADR = Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
Table 1. The selected cases 
 
The unit of analysis in all cases was an IS project in an SME environment that was subject to an OISF. Since 
this was a multiple-case study, we followed replication logic to offer external validity. „Generalizability‟ is of 
major concern in all research, but in this kind of work, it cannot be statistical. The kind of generalization that 
was established was an analytical generalization or a generalization from case study findings to theory (Lee 
and Baskerville, 2003; Yin, 2003). The theoretical generalization from the empirical description in our case 
study has no value beyond the given cases. However, the generalization from ideographic details to theory is 
important for the clarification of theoretical concepts. Therefore, the cases were chosen carefully, in order to 
accomplish literal replication logic (seven cases), as well as theoretical replication logic (one case). In each 
  
 
case, there was at least some initial evidence of incomplete and asymmetric information, hidden actions and 
hidden intentions on behalf of the agent. 
We used a longitudinal approach in all cases. Three sources of evidence were used to ensure construct validity: 
1) documents, 2) focus and open-ended interviews, and 3) direct and participant observations. Project 
documentation, minutes from steering committee meetings, memoranda and letters were analysed. Documents 
were delivered by three sources: plaintiff, defendant, and expert witness. The documents of the plaintiff and 
defendant were often the same, but were brought into litigation because of opposing opinions. All reports of 
expert witnesses were exposed through cross-examination of all parties and were corrected if material errors 
occurred. This resulted in an extra triangulation of the available data. The interviews were recorded on 
audiotapes, written down in reports, and sent to all parties for cross-examination. All interviews took place in 
the presence of all parties and the expert witness. The sites of the case studies were visited at least four times 
for the purpose of doing interviews and making direct observations. The data coming from all sources were 
coded by means of a coding scheme, which is part of the protocol of the case study. The coding scheme 
separates the basic data from the metadata (the documents, reports and sheets) and was designed to avoid data 
contamination. All data were stored in a computerized case study database and links were made between basic 
data and metadata. The data are retrievable by computer but are also available in original and raw format for 
reviewers. 
Data were analysed in two steps. The first step was a „within-case analysis‟ to review the unique patterns of 
each case. Second, a „cross-case analysis‟ was conducted in search of common patterns. The cases were 
selected to allow comparison and to maximize variation, while respecting the ceteris paribus criteria, so that 
our multiple case study is analogous with multiple experiments as shown in Table 1. 
Similarities pertain to the size of the enterprises; all principal sites are family-owned SMEs, and there is a 
strategic importance for the IS project. In terms of variation, three projects are ERP implementations, three 
projects are software development and implementation projects (SDI), and one project is a software 
development project without implementation (SD). Customizing took place for all ERP projects. Two cases 
(Stones and Boxcars) were subject to alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 
Table 2 gives an overview of the observations in our research. For each case, we looked at: 
 Type of contract: outcome-based and behaviour-based. In some cases, a mixed type was discovered in 
which some parts of the contact were outcome-based (in particular software licenses) and others (in 
particular, consultancy fees) were behaviour-based;  
 Structural controls: appropriate mechanisms including deliverables, reporting arrangements, meeting 
schedules, and penalty clauses for governing the project. We searched for two aspects of structural 
controls: those stipulated in the contract and those applied during the course of the project; 
 Information asymmetry: traces of private information at both parties; 
 Hidden actions: traces of hidden actions of principle and agent; 
 Lack of commitment, including the lack of oversight and engagement by executives; 
 Well defined user requirements;  
 Level of trust: deterrence-based or calculus-based, knowledge-based and identification-based; 
 Distrust evocation: broken promises, lies and personnel changes in the project team; 
 Trust deterioration or decline of trust: parties reacting with formal writing; 
 Trust-building mechanisms: integrity (fulfilling promises, telling the truth), predictability 
(consistency, clear roles with responsibilities and accountabilities), communications (openness, 
receptivity, creating common language), and commitment and sharing of control. 
  
 
 
Observation Case Rockit Case Woody Case Mach Case Bupo 
IT maturity CMM
1
 level 1 CMM level 1 CMM level 1 CMM level 1 
Type of contract Behaviour-based Outcome-based Mixed  Outcome-based 
Structural controls in 
contract / in project 
Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/No 
Private information (agent) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Private information  
(principal)  
Yes No Yes No 
Hidden actions agent No Yes Yes Yes 
Hidden actions principal No No Yes No 
Lack of commitment (agent) No Yes Yes Yes 
Lack of commitment 
(principal)  
No No No No 
Well defined requirements No Yes No Yes 
Level of trust Identification Deterrence  Deterrence  Deterrence  
Distrust evocation No Yes Yes Yes 
Trust deterioration No Yes Yes Yes 
Trust-building mechanisms Yes  No No No 
Observation Case Dybo Case Stones Case Boxcars Case Hero 
IT maturity CMM level 0  CMM Level 2 CMM level 1 CMM level 0 
Type of contract Mixed Behaviour-based Mixed Outcome-based 
Structural controls in 
contract / in project 
No/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/No 
Private information (agent) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Private information  
(principal)  
No No No Yes 
Hidden actions agent No Yes Yes No 
Hidden actions principal No No No No 
Lack of commitment (agent) No No No No 
Lack of commitment 
(principal)  
Yes No Yes Yes 
Well defined requirements Yes Yes Yes No 
Level of trust Deterrence  Knowledge Deterrence  Deterrence  
Distrust evocation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trust deterioration Yes No No Yes 
Trust-building mechanisms No No No No 
  1 CMM = Capability Maturity Model 
Level 0: Complete lack of any recognisable IT processes. The enterprise had not even 
recognised that there is an issue to be addressed. 
Level 1: Initial level. There is evidence that the enterprise has recognised that IT issues exist 
and need to be addresses. However there are no standardised processes and the management 
approach is ad hoc.  
Level 2: Repeatable level. The IT processes have developed to the stage where similar 
procedures are followed by different people undertaking the same task. There is however no 
formal training and responsibility is left to the individual.    
 Table 2. Overview and summary of case observations 
  
  
 
Results 
We have summarized the major observations of trust, information asymmetry and hidden actions in Table 3 
and structural controls, trust and type of contract in Table 4. Table 4 is also the presentation of the logic behind 
the falsification of the propositions. 
 
Case OISF Trust Information 
Asymmetry 
Hidden 
Actions 
Agent 
Hidden 
Actions 
Principal 
Rockit No Yes Yes No No 
Woody Yes No Yes Yes No 
Mach Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Bupo Yes No Yes Yes No 
Dybo Yes No Yes No No 
Stones No Yes Yes Yes No 
Boxcars No Yes Yes Yes No 
Hero Yes No Yes No No 
 Table 3. Summary of the findings: Information Asymmetry and Hidden Actions 
  
First, the observations in Table 3 indicate that Agency Theory certainly has the power to predict opportunistic 
behaviour in situations where information asymmetry is at play. In all cases, information asymmetry could be 
observed and in five cases (Woody, Mach, Bupo, Stones and Boxcars) this led to hidden actions of the agent. 
However, in one case (case Mach), hidden actions on behalf of the principal could also be observed. This is a 
finding that was already suggested by Moynihan. “Agency Theory views the exchange primarily from the 
perspective of the principal.  But what of the agent‟s perspective? What strategies can agents use to protect 
themselves from potentially opportunistic or other unfavourable forms of behaviour on the part of the 
principal” (Moynihan, 2002: 378)? Aubert et al. report similar findings: “Both clients and vendors tend to 
behave opportunistically when entering into a contract and this can lead to mutual disadvantage” (Aubert et 
al.,2003: 183). 
Hidden actions on behalf of the agent, once revealed, led to a withdrawal of trust by the principal in three 
relevant cases (Woody, Mach and Bupo). However, for the cases Dybo and Hero, there was a deterioration of 
trust but no hidden action on behalf of the agent could be observed.; the agent was playing with open cards, no 
hidden actions could be observed and no evocation of distrust occurred.  
In Table 4, we can observe the competing theoretical constructs and the derived propositions. 
 
Case OISF Trust Structured 
Controls 
Outcome- 
based 
contract P1 P2 P3 P4 
Rockit No Yes No No No No No No 
Woody Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Mach Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Bupo Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Dybo Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stones No Yes Yes No No No No No 
Boxcars No Yes Yes No No No No No 
Hero Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
 Table 4. Summary of the findings: falsification of the propositions.  
  
 
 Light shadowing (green) indicates a confirmation of the proposition. 
 Dark shadowing (red) indicates a falsification of the proposition  
The falsification of proposition P1 is carried out by comparing the column „Structured Controls‟ with the 
column „OISF‟. There are five OISFs (Woody, Mach, Bupo, Dybo and Hero) and there are five cases with no 
structured controls (Rockit, Mach, Bupo, Dybo and Hero). Only the cases Mach, Bupo, Dybo and Hero match 
all of the findings of proposition P1. These cases are highlighted in green in the column P1. In these four 
cases, no structured controls were applied and the OISF took place. However, in case Rockit, we could also 
observe an absence of structural controls, although no OISF occurred. The case Rockit is highlighted in red in 
the column P1.This led to the conclusion that proposition P1 is falsified. OISFs do not always happen if there 
are no structured controls. 
Concerning proposition P2, and following the same logic, but now for the construct „Outcome-based contract‟, 
only case Dybo followed a pattern that matched with proposition P2. There was no outcome-based contract 
but an OSIF occurred in this case. However, the cases Stones and Boxcars also had no outcome-based 
contracts and an OISF did not occur. These parties went to alternative dispute resolution. The CEOs sat around 
the table to work on a solution to save the project and to save a future collaboration. An emerging OISF, which 
was already ripe to bring into litigation, was avoided. In case Rockit, there was no outcome-based contract and 
no OISF occurred. This led to the conclusion that proposition P2 is falsified. 
The most compelling evidence can be found for proposition P3, in which only cases Dybo and Rockit showed 
a relevant match with the conditions. Structured controls were not applied and there was no outcome-based 
contract. Case Dybo went into litigation with an OSIF; however, in case Rockit, there was no OISF, leading to 
the conclusion that proposition P3 is falsified. 
Finally, all relevant empirical patterns in the cases matched with proposition P4. An OSIF must happen if 
there is no trust between the principal and the agent. 
Discussion 
We can conclude that trust is presumably more important than output-based contracts for eliminating 
opportunistic behaviour in family-owned SMEs. Even with structural controls in place, trust is necessary to 
prevent failure. Trust also seems to be more important than structural controls for eliminating opportunistic 
behaviour in SMEs. The propositions, deduced from Agency Theory, are theoretical but not empirically 
logical. The world of family-owned SMEs is significantly different from that of large companies. Although we 
did not find any evidence that the same findings may also hold true for non-SMEs, we believe that the specific 
management structure in family-owned SMEs, centred round the CEO as the main decision-maker, is truly a 
discriminating factor. 
There is another intriguing finding. In all cases, except case Rockit, we could observe evocation of distrust on 
behalf of the agent. In these cases, we could observe that sales representatives of the agent organization made 
promises in the tendering phase of the project that could not be fulfilled once the project had started. The fact 
that those promises were accepted is probably due to the lack of power of observation of the principal, ex ante. 
Although these promises often touched the essentials of an outsourced IS project, on commitments such as 
price, budget and quality (functionality), agents made them in vain and therefore jeopardized the success of the 
outsourced IS project. Ex post, when the contract was signed and the endeavour with the agent actually began, 
the agent did not keep his promises, which evoked mistrust with the principal very early in the project 
trajectory, and this could not always be mended during the course of the project, due to a lack of trust-building 
mechanisms. These observations were predicted by Agency Theory and the false promises led to an adverse 
selection by the principal. This is a most interesting topic, which needs further investigation. 
We cannot conclude that structural controls are pointless in SME environments. However, it can be seen as a 
serious warning to independent software vendors to take care when they step into an IS project with a SME. 
  
 
They should be aware that SMEs often lack the necessary skills to conduct an IS project with the proper 
structured controls. When controls fail, trust should take over.  
This could also indicate that trust and control are not necessarily rival theories. As Reed stated, “In short, the 
conventional dichotomy between normatively-based trust and politically-based control has become 
unsustainable, as the theoretical and empirical work in organizational analysis has consistently blurred the 
putative analytical and substantive boundaries between them” (Reed, 2001: 202).  
The findings that trust is an important construct between collaborating partners raise some important 
considerations on how to deal with trust from a managerial perspective. First, the issue of deterioration of trust 
is a major concern for the agent. Although trust has a reciprocal nature, it is the agent who has to work hardest 
on trust-building mechanisms in order to maintain or to increase the level of trust. Devos et al. found that there 
is always incentive for adverse selection and moral hazard as long as the SME-principal is not willing to pay 
the costs required to avoid the asymmetry of information (Devos et al., 2010). The market where SMEs buy IT 
is attractive for small independent software vendors (ISV) acting as business partners of top-notch ERP 
suppliers and IS/IT suppliers. However, the capability and maturity level of the ISVs is often inadequate to 
match the demands and complex challenges of an IS implementation in a SME environment. A situation of 
severe asymmetry of information occurs because SMEs are not well informed about the correct IT/IS 
capabilities of the ISVs, the broad functionalities of the software package and the efforts needed to adapt the 
software to their specific requirements. The findings indicate that this almost always leads to opportunistic or 
even unethical behaviour on behalf of the ISV.   
 
Conclusions 
It has always been assumed that IT governance is achieved through control of IT, with Control Theory acting 
as a sole basis for conceptualizing IT governance. Consequently, practitioners adopt the Control Theory stance 
in operationalizing IT governance. However, caution is needed in applying the mechanisms of IT governance 
in an SME environment (Institute 2007). We argue that in a SME environment, social-psychological processes 
with constructs like trust (and probably also fairness, intuition and empathy) are of more importance in 
explaining the complex IT governance phenomena than are Agency Theory and (formal) Control Theory, and 
are therefore, more appropriate for deriving guidelines for practitioners. Our findings clearly show that the role 
of governance is different in SMEs than in large companies. SMEs require simple and informal control 
systems with adequate reporting and a higher focus on people. The CEO is the crucial stakeholder of an IS 
project in a SME, and very often, this CEO lacks commitment, time and knowledge. This suggests an 
important unit of analysis for future empirical research. The authors argue that practitioners as well as 
researchers should incorporate a more idiosyncratic profile of SMEs in their way of thinking when dealing 
with SMEs and IT governance. 
OISFs in SMEs appear to occur due to a lack of trust of the principal in the actions of the agent during an IS 
project. Our findings indicate that SMEs tend to lean more on trust and trust building in a collaborative project 
than on structured controls. It is remarkable that the level of trust is also important. Deterrence-based trust is 
not enough to be considered as an inhibitor for an OISF. Deterrence-based trust can be seen as a structured 
control since it is rooted in the rewards and punishments associated with a particular project and incorporated 
in the written contract (Sabherwal, 1999). Only the more developed levels of trust prevent failure. 
These findings can be surprising and counterintuitive, with structural controls appearing to be less important 
than trust. However, this can be explained by the lack of managerial maturity on behalf of the CEO of the 
SME, leading to serious asymmetry of information between principal and agent during the course of the 
project. It appears that SMEs choose to rely on trust rather than to incur the costs of the controls needed to 
level out the asymmetry of information.  
  
 
In our conclusion, we cannot neglect the descriptive power of Agency Theory in a SME – OISF setting, even 
though the theory disregards the issue of trust. Nooteboom reaches similar results in his work on trust, 
opportunism and governance with the Transaction Cost Economy as an underlying theory (Nooteboom, 1996). 
Since the theory of Transaction Cost Economy (TCE) is also regarded as a founding theory for IS outsourcing, 
this may lead to suggestions for further research on TCE and trust in the same SME-OISF settings.  
For researchers and practitioners, our findings also indicate that it would be more meaningful to start with a 
SME orientation, instead of starting with the way things are organized in large companies and thus considering 
only the perspective of control. The transplantation of existing IT governance mechanisms into SME soil is 
falling short, due to a lack of fertile theoretical foundations. Therefore, a rethinking of IT governance for 
SMEs is needed. 
This study is subject to some limitations. Addressing a broad and relatively new research field of the 
governance of IT in SMEs highlights the need for more empirical evidence. Although the generalizations 
made in this work are of an analytical kind, the problem of external validity is recognized. Since this work is 
qualitative research, based on multiple case studies, we invite researchers to apply a wider variety of research 
methods and enlarge the external validity of the findings with quantitative techniques and surveys. 
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